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UTILITY PATENT APPLICATION TRANSMITTAL

(Only for new nonprovisional applications
under 37 CFR 1.53(b))

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First Inventor or Application Identifier Adrian O.
Mancini
Title Dynamic Trust Anchor System and Method
Express Mail Label No. EL286432156US

APPLICATION ELEMENTS
See MPEP chapter 600 concerning utility patent application
contents.

ADDRESS TO: Assistant Commissioner for Patents
Box Patent Application
Washington, DC 20231

1. ☒ **Fee Transmittal Form**
(Submit an original, and a duplicate for fee processing)
2. ☒ **Specification** Total Pages 18
(preferred arrangement set forth below)
 - Descriptive title of the Invention
 - Cross References to Related Applications
 - Statement Regarding Fed sponsored R & D
 - Reference to Microfiche Appendix
 - Background of the Invention
 - Brief Summary of the Invention
 - Brief Description of the Drawings (if filed)
 - Detailed Description
 - Claim(s)
 - Abstract of the Disclosure
3. ☒ **Drawings (35 USC 113)** Total Sheets 3
4. **Oath or Declaration** Total Pages 2
 - a. ☒ **Newly executed** (original or copy)
 - b. ☐ **Copy from a prior application**
(37 CFR 1.63(d))
(for continuation/divisional with Box 17 completed)
[Note Box 5 below]
 - i. ☐ **DELETION OF INVENTOR(S)**
Signed statement attached deleting
inventor(s) named in the prior application,
see 37 CFR 1.63(d)(2) and 1.33(b).

5. ☐ **Microfiche Computer Program (Appendix)**
6. ☐ **Nucleotide and/or Amino Acid Sequence
Submission (if applicable, all necessary)**
 - a. ☐ **Computer Readable Copy**
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ACCOMPANYING APPLICATION PARTS

7. ☒ **Assignment Papers** (cover sheet & document(s))
8. ☐ **37 CFR 3.73(b) Statement** ☒ **Power of
(when there is an assignee) Attorney**
9. ☐ **English Translation Document** (if applicable)
10. ☐ **Information Disclosure** ☐ **Copies of
Statement (IDS)/PTO-1449 IDS Citations**
11. ☐ **Preliminary Amendment**
12. ☒ **Return Receipt Postcard (MPEP 503)**
(Should be specifically itemized)
13. ☐ **Small Entity** ☐ **Statement filed in Prior
Statement(s) Application, Status still
proper and desired.**
14. ☐ **Certified Copy of Priority Document(s)**
(if foreign priority is claimed)
15. ☒ **Other Check for \$818.00**

16. If a CONTINUING APPLICATION, check appropriate box and supply the requisite information:


☐ **Continuation** ☐ **Divisional** ☐ **Continuation-in-part (CIP)** of prior application No:
Prior Application Information: Examiner Group / Art Unit:

17. CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS

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Signature		Date	6/2/99

5

DYNAMIC TRUST ANCHOR SYSTEM AND METHOD
Cross Reference to Related Co-pending Application

10 This application is related to a co-pending application entitled " Method and
Apparatus for Public Key Management" filed on July 25, 1997 having serial number
08/901,054, incorporated herein in its entirety by reference and owned by instant
assignee.

Field Of The Invention

15

The invention relates generally to information security systems and more
particularly to information security systems employing rooted hierarchical structures of
trusted authorities.

20

Background Of The Invention

Information security systems, such as computer network based systems
employing public key techniques to encrypt and decrypt data, typically use a certification
25 authority, such as a series of network servers to generate certificates that are used by
network nodes or other certificate issuing units, to verify, among other things, that other
communications sent by subscribers are valid. Computer network security systems are
known which allow network nodes to have several software applications that use the
same security enforcement rules by having a cryptographic application which is
30 accessible by each of the applications. For example, an e-mail application may access the
cryptographic engine to encrypt e-mail messages. Likewise, a financial document

generation application may also allow access to the cryptographic engine to encrypt financial documents that may be transferred over communication links.

Conventional systems typically encode security policy rules in the network nodes (eg. a subscriber unit) so that a node requires upgraded software each time a security officer changes a policy rule. Some global policies include, for example, a lifetime of a password, whether or not passwords can be reused, password length, the type of cryptographic keys allowable for a particular node, and other policies. Increasingly, information security systems are becoming larger and larger. For example, a system may include dozens or hundreds of certificate issuing units or network servers that are used to generate certificates for hundreds, thousands and even hundreds of thousands of subscribers. As know in the art, one structure for facilitating verification of certificates in trusted information security systems, includes the implementation of a rooted hierarchy. In such a trust hierarchy, the root authority (or trust authority) serves as the trusted source and signs certificates for lower tiered or subordinate certification units. The subordinate authorities act as the starting trust anchors or local authorities for a specified number of subscribers. Each subscriber then obtains a certificate signed by the local verification authority to determine whether another subscriber within the system is trusted, based on whether or not a signed certificate by a trusted authority is deemed valid by a subscriber.

However, it is desirable to provide policy control flexibility in instances where policy rules need to be changed on a per application or per subscriber basis each time, for example, a subscriber logs in to the system or for any other suitable purpose. In addition, as information security systems become more complex, differing subscribers may have differing security needs and therefore it would be desirable to have a system that is flexible in providing centralized policy rules to each subordinate unit instead of requiring each subordinate unit to know and maintain policy rules of the entire system or require the root authority to control all policy rules. As such, it would be desirable to have a root policy provider be able to delegate to subordinate certificate issuing units within the system. However, such a system should accommodate, dynamically, variations and changes in policy rules.

In addition, typical rooted hierarchies have a single anchor of trust. Each certificate issuing unit then has a corresponding certificate that is signed by the root certificate issuing unit so that the subscribers trust the signature applied by each of their anchor (local) certificate authorities. Some systems also allow cross certification by one certification authority with another certification authority so that the subscribers may more efficiently obtain verification from a subsequent certification authority where desired. However, it would be desirable to allow cross certification of outside agencies or outside nodes from the primary trust community to readily expand the operational community for subscribers. Also, the centralized policy control should also be maintained to provide a more secure system.

Consequently, there exists a need for an information security system that provides flexible policy delegation in a rooted hierarchy system to allow added certification authorities to provide policy rule information either to additional subordinate certification authorities and/or to subscribers. Such a system should allow a variation of trust anchors for a subscriber to facilitate trust adjustment to reduce compromises to a certification authority in the hierarchy. It would also be desirable if such a system employed inter-certification authority verification messages to facilitate dynamic selection of validation starting authorities among the subordinate authorities.

Brief Description Of The Drawings

The features of the present invention together with the advantages thereof, may be understood by reference to the following description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings wherein:

FIGURE 1 is a block diagram of an information security system in accordance with one embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating one embodiment of a superior trust authority and a subordinate trust authority in accordance with one embodiment of the invention; and

FIG. 3 is a flow chart illustrating the operation of the system shown in FIG. 2.

Detailed Description Of The Preferred Embodiment

5 Briefly, an information security network provides a plurality of trusted authorities configurable in a rooted hierarchical structure. At least one of the trusted authorities is a superior authority and at least one of the trusted authorities are subordinate authorities. The trust authorities are capable of issuing digitally signed data structures, referred to as certificates. The superior authority is operative to generate policy control message data,
10 such as separate message data or a certificate containing policy information, to dynamically vary policy control data to facilitate trust authority policy delegation among subordinate authorities. The policy control data includes, among other things, inter-trusted authority trust modification data to dynamically vary validation starting authorities among subordinate authorities. The validation starting authorities may use
15 signed data structures (messages, non-messages or any suitable data).

In one embodiment, at least one of the subordinate authorities includes a certificate issuer responsive to the inter-trusted authority modification data, that issues certificates for at least one subscriber based on the inter-trusted authority modification
20 data. The inter-trusted authority modification data may fall into several categories including data pertinent among a CA and subscriber, and among subscribers. For example, the inter-trusted authority modification data may include, for example, trusted anchor modification data indicating that the trust anchor for a given subscriber may be modified. The inter-trusted authority modification data may also include, for example,
25 data representing the scope of certification for a subordinate authority such as data representing authority cross certification allowance, whether a subordinate certification authority can create another subordinate certification authority, subordinate authority password rule data, subscriber trust anchor rule data and subscriber password rule data and any other suitable policy data. Trust anchor modification data may also include data,
30 for example, that a superior authority passes to one or more subordinate authorities through a certificate stored in a repository, such as an X.509 repository so that the trust

anchor for a given subscriber may be modified by a subordinate authority without requiring action by the superior certification authority.

FIG. 1 shows an information security system 10 having a rooted hierarchical structure that includes a superior authority 12, such as a root trust authority, and a plurality of subordinate trust authorities 14a, 14b, 14n. A plurality of subscribers 16a, 16b, 16c and 16n are shown which trust a specific starting (local) authority. For example, as shown, subscriber 16b uses a subordinate trust authority 14a as an initial starting authority, meaning the trust authority 14a signs the public key certificate of the subscriber 16b. A certificate repository 18, such as an X.509 repository is also used to store the various certificates used in the system. It will be recognized however, that any suitable storage mechanism and format may be used if desired. The trust authorities may be suitably programmed processing units or any other suitable apparatus as desired. Similarly, subscribers may be any suitable program processing units or any suitable apparatus. For example, suitably programmed IBM PC's or other mobile units may be used if desired.

The superior authority 12 generates policy control message data 20a, 20b and 20c which may be in the form of a signed data structure such as an X.509 certificate or a non-signed data structure if desired. The policy control message data 20a - 20c is used to dynamically vary policy control data among subordinate trust authorities to delegate policy control from the superior authority. As such, the policy control message data 20a - 20c dynamically varies validation starting authorities among subordinate authorities where subordinate trust authorities use the information to change the trust anchor for a given subscriber unit. The dashed lines 22a and 22b represent that a cross certification has been authorized by the data in the policy control message data 20 - 20c. The lines 24a - 24n represent a trust relationship initially between a subscriber and a starting trust authority. The lines 26a - 26n represent communication links between the respected trust authorities and the X.509 repository to store and retrieve information stored therein, such as certificate revocation list (CRL) information and certificates. In operation, the root trust authority or superior authority 12 effectively generates data that is extracted by

subordinate authorities to allow a subordinate authority to execute and define policy control. For example, the subordinate authority may be allowed to cross certify with another specified subordinate authority as dictated by the superior authority 12, thus allowing distributed control of trust anchors so that a subscriber's trust anchor changes

5 from one CA to a different CA under control of a superior authority. In addition, the policy control message data 20a - 20c may indicate that the subordinate authorities can certify other subordinate authorities or only subscribers. Other policy information that may be set forth in the policy control message data 20a - 20c may be, for example, what password rules should be used by the subordinate certification authority. In addition, the

10 subordinate trust authorities create certificates for respective subscribers and also specify, if desired, one or more trust anchors for subscribers. The mechanism to provide the policy control message data 20a - 20c can take many forms, for example, the information may be published in a certificate which may include, for example, digitally signed structures including policy information and rules that should be followed by a

15 subordinate trust authority. The certificates or information may be obtainable through a public directory or by communicating this information directly to the subordinate authority such as store and forward communication or session oriented communications, in a secure manner if desired.

20 Also as shown, a subordinate authority may also become a superior authority if the subordinate authority is controlling policy information for another subordinate authority. By having dynamic control and limitation of differing trust relationships, the system can employ a dynamic multi-rooted hierarchy which may include, for example, different anchors of trust. One anchor may be, for example, the starting authority or local

25 authority which initially issues the certificate for a given subscriber. Another trust anchor for a given subscriber could be a superior CA or certification authority and the final root anchor could be the root trust authority as specified by the chain of superior signed certification authority certificates leading up to the root trust authority.

30 FIG. 2 shows by way of example, the superior authority 12 having a policy control message data generator 30 and a trust anchor modification data certificate issuer

32. The policy control message data generator 30 generates policy control message data 34 to control which policy data is to be delegated or communicated to a subordinate authority or a plurality of subordinate authorities. The trust anchor modification data certificate issuer 32 creates a trust anchor modification data certificate 20a which includes the signature of the superior authority 12.

The policy control message data generator 30 may be, for example, a graphic user interface that receives data from a security officer wherein the data includes policy information that the superior authority is delegating or changing for subordinate authorities. The policy control message data may be populated in a signed certificate, such as an X.509 type of certificate, the data may be written to a signed file, the data may be communicated through an email communication, or dynamically and directly from one CA to another CA, or in any suitable manner.

By way of example, and not by limitation, the following list and tables represent different types of policy control message data and data indicating when the policy data is used.

Types:

1. CA-to-CA Policy Data (CCPD)-Policy data specified by a superior CA to a subordinate CA that affects the operational behavior of a CA directly (e.g. distinguished name (DN) constraints for CA entities).

2. CA-to-CA Subscriber Policy Data (CCSPD)-Policy data specified by a superior CA to a subordinate CA that affects the operational behavior of a CA subscriber directly (e.g. DN constraints for end-entities).

3. CA Initialization Configuration (CIC)

A CA policy configuration point which corresponds to the initialization of the CA. CA initialization coincides with the starting of various CA services including the very first time the services are started and any subsequent restarting of the services.

4. CA Dynamic Configuration (CDC)

A CA policy configuration point which can occur anytime after initialization and while the CA is active.

The following tables break up known policy data into CCPD and CCSPD types and

indicate the policy configuration points (the time when an entity typically uses the policy data).

CCPD

Configuration

5	1. Allowable CA DN	CIC/CDC
	2. Allowable CA DN in cross-certificate	CIC/CDC
	3. Number of Approvals for CA operation	CIC/CDC
	4. Certificate Expiry intervals	CIC/CDC
	5. Disable Certificate update	CIC/CDC
10	6. CRL lifetimes	CIC/CDC
	7. Allow Administrators to issue CRLs	CIC/CDC
	8. Allow revoked certificates to remain in CRL	CIC/CDC
	9. Cross-certificate lifetime	CIC/CDC
	10. Cross-certificate policyConstraints	CIC/CDC
15	11. Cross-certificate nameConstraints	CIC/CDC
	12. Cross-certificate Policy OIDs	CIC/CDC
	13. Cross-certificate Policy Mappings	CIC/CDC
	14. CA certificate lifetime	CIC/CDC
	15. CA signing key lifetime	CIC/CDC
20	16. CA signing key algorithm	CIC
	17. CA key pair replacement grace period	CIC/CDC
	18. CA key length	CIC
	19. CA database encryption algorithm	CIC/CDC
	20. CA database integrity algorithm	CIC
25	21. Allow CA services autologin	CIC/CDC
	22. CA user licence limits	CIC/CDC
	23. Central Respository address	CIC/CDC

CCSPD

Configuration

30	1. Allowable end-user DN	CIC
	2. Control of ability to force new user certificates with old keys	CIC/CDC
	3. User certificate hashing algorithm	CIC/CDC
	4. User signature algorithm	CIC/CDC
35	5. User encryption alogirthm	CIC/CDC
	6. User encryption certificate lifetime	CIC/CDC
	7. User verification certificate lifetime	CIC/CDC
	8. User signing key lifetime	CIC/CDC
	9. User encryption certificate policy OIDs	CIC/CDC
40	10. User verification certificate policy OIDs	CIC/CDC
	11. User signing key algorithm	CIC/CDC
	12. User key pair length	CIC/CDC
	13. User epf password lifetime	CIC/CDC
	14. User epf auto-logout interval	CIC/CDC
45	15. User email address as SubjectAltName	CIC/CDC

Accordingly, the policy control message data may be, for example, trust anchor verification data that includes data representing subordinate authority cross certification allowance data. For example the data may indicate that one CA can cross-certify with
5 CAs within a predefined group identified by domain names of CAs. The policy control message data may also include subordinate authority certification rule data. For example, this data may define that a CA can only certify a subordinate CAs but the subordinate CA subscribers must be high assurance users, such as users that use a large encryption key versus a smaller encryption key. Other policy control message data may include
10 subordinate authority password rule data representing that a subordinate CA operator must use minimum length passwords of 10 characters and also use hardware tokens for authentication. Policy control message data may also include subscriber trusted anchor rule data that represents data indicating that a subscriber must use the root CA public verification key when validating all certificates; or a subscriber must use the root CA
15 public verification key as the anchor of trust (starting point) when validating all certificates, except when validating subscribers who belong to a subscribers local CA. The policy control message data may further include subscriber password rule data indicating that subscribers must only use minimum 8 character passwords or other password related criteria. Other policy control data may also include certificate expiry
20 policy such as requiring all users within the subordinate CA must be issued certificates that expire after a maximum of two years, subscriber algorithm policy (i.e. all operators and subscribers of this subordinate CA must use the RSA 1024-bit algorithm for signing and the RSA 2048-bit algorithm for encrypting, subordinate authority algorithm policy (i.e. all subordinate CAs must use the RSA 2048-bit algorithm for their subordinate CA
25 signing key pair) and other policy data. Also, policy control message data may include administration policy data certificate revocation list policy data, such as data controlling the publishing schedules of certificate revocation lists

The trust anchor inter-modification data certificate issuer 32 generates the trust
30 anchor modification data certificate 20a by applying a digital signature to the policy control message data and also includes standard certificate information, such as expiry

data and other suitable data. The trust anchor modification data certificate may be generated as a type of X.509 certificate but with the inter-trusted authority trust modification data as a data component. The superior authority 12 then publishes the trust anchor modification data certificate 20a in the repository 18. Alternatively, the superior authority may directly communicate the change in policy information to the requisite subordinate authority if desired.

The subordinate authority 14a includes a certificate verifier 36, a subscriber trust anchor specifier 38, a certificate issuer 40 and memory 42. The subordinate authority 14a periodically checks the repository to determine whether or not the trust anchor modification data certificate is present for that specified authority. A specified authority may determine this based on subordinate authority identification data stored in the certificate by the superior authority. However, it will be recognized that any suitable mechanism may also be used.

The certificate verifier 36 performs standard certificate verification on the trust anchor modification data certificate obtained from the repository. The certificate verifier 36 may check the digital signature of the superior authority that is placed on the trust anchor modification data certificate along with the requisite certification revocation list to determine whether the trust anchor modification data certificate that was retrieved is valid. If the certificate is valid, the inter-trusted authority modification data (policy control message data) is then retrieved. This data is as shown as data 34. A copy of this data is stored in memory 42. For example, where this data indicates that the subordinate authority may cross certify or create another subordinate authority, the inter-trusted authority modification data 34 is stored so that the authority knows what is approved policy. Where the inter-trusted authority modification data 34 indicates a new validation starting authority, the subscriber trust anchor specifier 38 analyzes which subordinate authority has been indicated as the new trust anchor and generates the trust anchor modification data 44 to indicate a new trust anchor for a given subordinate authority or subscriber as desired. Whether the trust anchor is for another subordinate authority or

subscriber may be indicated by the superior authority in the inter-trusted modification data.

When the trust anchor changes the certificate issuer 40 generates a new certificate
5 with a signature of the subordinate authority 14a for a new subscriber and stores the new
certificate 46 in the repository. The subscriber may then treat the subordinate authority
14a as a new starting authority or local authority. The trust anchor modification data
represents a trust anchor different from a local trust authority. In other words, the
subordinate authority 14a may have been a local trust authority or starting trust authority
10 for a given subscriber, the subordinate authority may then indicate that it is a trust anchor
for another subscriber or that it is a trust authority for another subordinate authority if
desired. A subscriber trust anchor generates the trust anchor modification data to also
include identification data of the subscribers being affected by the change or the
subordinate authority being created or also affected by the change. In this way,
15 respective subordinate authorities and subscribers may scan or review the certificates in
the repository and retrieve those that pertain directly to them.

The trusted authority modification data 34 is stored in memory 42 based on the
receipt of the trust anchor modification data certificate and its subsequent verification.
20

FIG. 3 illustrates by way of example one method of operation of the system. As
shown in block 100, a rooted hierarchical trust authority structure is provided which
includes a root trust authority as well as a plurality of subordinate authorities. The
subordinate authorities serve as a trust anchor for various subscribers. The root authority
25 also serves as a trust anchor since the certificate generated by the root authority is trusted
by all subscribers in the system. The superior authority as shown by block 102, receives
policy modification control data through the graphic user interface that may be provided
through the policy control message generator 30. The superior authority 12 generates
inter-trusted modification data 34 by incorporating it in a trust anchor modification data
30 certificate 20a. This facilitates the dynamic varying of validation starting authorities for
subordinate authorities and/or other subscribers. This is shown in block 104. The inter-

trusted modification data may be, for example, the policy control message data. The trust anchor modification certificate issuer 32 incorporates this information into the trust anchor modification data certificate as shown in block 106. As shown in block 108, this information is stored by the superior authority in the repository. On a periodic basis, for example, during each session between a subscriber and a CA, each subordinate authority in the system retrieves the certificates for their respective authority.

Alternatively, after initialization, as shown in block 110, the superior authority may generate modification data in the form of a message to a particular subordinate authority (or authorities) to indicate that a change in policy would be occurring. The subordinate authority, as shown in block 112, obtains the designated generated certificate from the repository and verifies the signature on the certificate as shown in block 114. If the signature verified in the certificate has not been revoked, the system extracts the inter-trusted data modification data from the certificate and then stores a copy of this data in memory as shown in block 116. Based on the type of inter-trusted authority modification data, the subscriber trusted anchor specifier 38 may specify a new trust anchor for a new subordinate authority or subscriber unit and indicate this as trust anchor modification data 44. The subordinate authority then generates the trust anchor modification data certificate 46 using the certificate issuer 40 as shown block 118. As shown in block 120, the trust anchor modification data certificate is then stored in repository 18 for retrieval by a suitable subscriber or other subordinate authority as shown in block 120. Alternatively, the system may generate messages for subordinate authorities.

It should be understood that the implementation of other variations and modifications of the invention in its various aspects will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art, and that the invention is not limited by the specific embodiments described. It is therefore contemplated to cover by the present invention, any and all modifications, variations, or equivalents that fall within the spirit and scope of the basic underlying principles disclosed and claimed herein.

Claims

What Is Claimed Is:

- 5 1. An information security system comprising:
a plurality of trusted authorities configurable in a rooted hierarchical structure
including at least one of the trusted authorities being a superior authority and at least one
of the trusted authorities being subordinate authorities; and
the superior authority operative to generate inter trusted authority trust
10 modification data to dynamically vary validation starting authorities among the
subordinate authorities.
- 15 2. The system of claim 1 wherein at least one of the subordinate authorities includes
a certificate issuer operatively responsive to the inter trusted authority modification data
for issuing certificates for at least one subscriber based on the inter trusted authority
modification data.
- 20 3. The system of claim 1 wherein at least one of the subordinate authorities includes
a subscriber trust anchor specifier, operatively responsive to the inter trusted authority
modification data, that generates trust anchor modification data for a plurality of
subscribers.
- 25 4. The system of claim 3 wherein the trust anchor modification data includes
subordinate trust anchor data representing at least one trust anchor different from a local
trust authority.
- 30 5. The system of claim 1 wherein the superior authority includes a trust anchor
modification data certificate issuer that provides the trust anchor modification data as a
signed data structure for the subordinate authorities.

6. The system of claim 1 wherein the trust anchor modification data includes data representing at least one of: scope of certification data, subordinate authority cross-certification allowance data, subordinate authority certification rule data, subordinate authority password rule data, subscriber trust anchor rule data and subscriber password rule data, certificate expiry policy, subscriber algorithm policy, and policy control message data.

7. The system of claim 1 wherein one of the trusted authorities is a root authority.

8. The system of claim 1 including subordinate authority memory containing data representing validation starting authority data, wherein the data is stored in response to receiving the inter trusted authority trust modification data.

9. An information security system comprising:
a plurality of trusted authorities configurable in a rooted hierarchical structure including at least one of the trusted authorities being a superior authority and at least one of the trusted authorities being subordinate authorities;

5 the superior authority operative to generate policy control message data to dynamically vary policy control data to facilitate trust authority policy delegation among the subordinate authorities wherein the policy control data includes inter trusted authority trust modification data to dynamically vary validation starting authorities among the subordinate authorities; and

10 wherein at least one of the subordinate authorities includes a certificate issuer operatively responsive to the inter trusted authority modification data for issuing certificates for at least one subscriber based on the inter trusted authority modification data and further includes a subscriber trust anchor specifier, operatively responsive to the inter trusted authority modification data, that generates trust anchor modification data for
15 a plurality of subscribers.

10. The system of claim 9 wherein the trust anchor modification data includes subordinate trust anchor data representing at least one trust anchor different from a local trust authority.

20 11. The system of claim 10 wherein the superior authority includes a trust anchor modification data certificate issuer that provides the trust anchor modification data as a signed data structure for the subordinate authorities.

25 12. The system of claim 9 wherein the trust anchor modification data includes data representing at least one of: scope of certification data, subordinate authority cross-certification allowance data, subordinate authority certification rule data, subordinate authority password rule data, subscriber trust anchor rule data and subscriber password rule data, certificate expiry policy, subscriber algorithm
30 policy, and policy control message data.

13. The system of claim 12 wherein one of the trusted authorities is a root authority.

14. The system of claim 13 including subordinate authority memory containing data representing validation starting authority data, wherein the data is stored in response to

5 receiving the inter trusted authority trust modification data.

15. A method for providing information security comprising:
providing a plurality of trusted authorities configurable in a rooted hierarchical
structure including at least one of the trusted authorities being a superior authority and at
least one of the trusted authorities being subordinate authorities; and
5 generating inter trusted authority trust modification data to dynamically vary
validation starting authorities among the subordinate authorities.

16. The method of claim 15 including issuing certificates for at least one subscriber
based on the inter trusted authority modification data.

17. The method of claim 15 including generating trust anchor modification data for a
plurality of subscribers.

18. The method of claim 17 wherein the trust anchor modification data includes
subordinate trust anchor data representing at least one trust anchor different from a local
trust authority.

19. The method of claim 15 including the step of providing the trust anchor
modification data as a signed data structure for the subordinate authorities.

20. The method of claim 15 wherein the trust anchor modification data includes data
representing at least one of: scope of certification data, subordinate authority
cross-certification allowance data, subordinate authority certification rule data,
subordinate authority password rule data, subscriber trust anchor rule data and
subscriber password rule data, certificate expiry policy, subscriber algorithm
policy, and policy control message data.

21. The method of claim 15 including the step of storing data representing validation
starting authority data, in response to receiving the inter trusted authority trust
modification data.

DYNAMIC TRUST ANCHOR SYSTEM AND METHOD

Abstract Of The Disclosure

5

An information security network provides a plurality of trusted authorities configurable in a rooted hierarchical structure. At least one of the trusted authorities is a superior authority and at least one of the trusted authorities are subordinate authorities. The trust authorities are capable of issuing digitally signed data structures, referred to as certificates. The superior authority is operative to generate policy control message data, such as separate message data or a certificate containing policy information, to dynamically vary policy control data to facilitate trust authority policy delegation among subordinate authorities. The policy control data includes, among other things, inter-trusted authority trust modification data to dynamically vary validation starting authorities among subordinate authorities.

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


FIG. 1




FIG. 2




FIG. 3

**DECLARATION
FOR UTILITY OR DESIGN
PATENT APPLICATION**

(37 CFR 1.63)

- ☒ Declaration Submitted with Initial Filing, OR
☐ Declaration Submitted after Initial Filing
(surcharge (37 CFR 1.16 (e)) required)

Attorney Docket Number 0500.01327
First Named Inventor Adrian O. Mancini
COMPLETE IF KNOWN
Application Number
Filing Date
Group Art Unit
Examiner Name

As a below named inventor, I hereby declare that:

My residence, post office address, and citizenship are as stated below next to my name.

I believe I am the original, first and sole inventor (if only one name is listed below) or an original, first and joint inventor (if plural names are listed below) of the subject matter which is claimed and for which a patent is sought on the invention entitled: **MULTI-ROOTED HIERARCHY SYSTEM**

the specification of which:

- ☒ is attached hereto.
☐ was file on (MM/DD/YYYY) as United States Application Number or PCT International Application Number and was amended on (MM/DD/YYYY) (if applicable).

I hereby state that I have reviewed and understand the contents of the above identified specification, including the claims, as amended by any amendment specifically referred to above.

I acknowledge the duty to disclose information which is material to patentability as defined in 37 CFR 1.56.

I hereby claim foreign priority benefits under 35 U.S.C. 119(a)-(d) or 365(b) of any foreign application(s) for patent or inventor's certificate, or 365(a) of any PCT international application which designated at least one country other than the United States of America, listed below and have also identified below, by checking the box, any foreign application for patent or inventor's certificate, or of any PCT international application having a filing date before that of the application on which priority is claimed.

Prior Foreign Application Number(s)	Country	Foreign Filing Date (MM/DD/YYYY)	Priority Not Claimed	Certified Copy Attached?	
				YES	NO
			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

- ☐ Additional foreign application numbers are listed on a supplemental priority data sheet PTO/SB/02B attached hereto.

I hereby claim the benefit under 35 U.S.C. 119(e) of any United States provisional application(s) listed below

Application Number(s)	Filing Data (MM/DD/YYYY)

- ☐ Additional provisional application numbers are listed on a supplemental priority data sheet PTO/SB/02B attached hereto.

I hereby claim the benefit under 35 U.S.C. 120 of any United States application(s), or 365(c) of any PCT international application designating the United States of America, listed below and, insofar as the subject matter of each of the claims of this application is not disclosed in the prior United States or PCT International application in the manner provided by the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112, I acknowledge the duty to disclose information which is material to patentability as defined in 37 CFR 1.56 which became available between the filing date of the prior application and the national or PCT international filing date of this application.

U.S. Parent Application or PCT Parent Number	Parent Filing Date (MM/DD/YYYY)	Parent Patent Number (if applicable)

- ☐ Additional U.S. or PCT international application numbers are listed on a supplemental priority data sheet PTO/SB/02B attached hereto.

Client No.

As a named inventor, I hereby appoint the following registered practitioner(s) to prosecute this application and to transact all business in the Patent and Trademark Office connected therewith:

Name	Registration Number	Name	Registration Number
Timothy W. Markison	33,534	Christopher J. Reckamp	34,414
Paul M. Anderson	39,896		

☐ Additional registered practitioner(s) named on supplemental Registered Practitioner Information sheet PTO/SB/02C attached hereto.


Direct all correspondence to:

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I hereby declare that all statements made herein of my own knowledge are true and that all statements made on information and belief are believed to be true; and further that these statements were made with the knowledge that willful false statements and the like so made are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, under 18 U.S.C. 1001 and that such willful false statements may jeopardize the validity of the application or any patent issued thereon.


Name of Sole or First Inventor:

☐ A petition has been filed for this unsigned inventor

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Inventor's Signature		Date	May 18, 99
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City: Nepean		State: Ont.	ZIP: K2G 6E6
Country: Canada			


Name of Additional Joint Inventor:

☐ A petition has been filed for this unsigned inventor

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☐ Additional inventors are being named on the _____ supplemental Additional Inventor(s) sheet(s) PTO/SB/02A attached hereto.